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The authors examine the impact of prison conditions on future criminal behavior. The
take over is based on a unique dataset on the post-release behavior of about twenty
thousand Italian former prison inmates. The authors use variation in prison assignment
as a means of identifying the effects of prison overcrowding, deaths in prison, and
degree of isolation on the probability of reoffending. They do not find compelling-
evidence of (specific) deterrent effects of experienced prison severity. The measures
of prison severity do not reduce the probability of recidivism. Instead, all point esti-
mates suggest that harsh prison conditions increase post-release criminal activity,
though they are not always precisely estimated. (JEL K42, J18)
1. Introduction
In modern criminal justice systems, imprisonment is the most important
form of sanction. The relevance of imprisonment as the main tool for the
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deterrence and incapacitation of criminals has increased in recent years, as the
substantial growth in prison populations in most countries shows. For exam-
ple, compared to the index year of 1990, by 2007 the number of inmates per
100,000 population had increased from 459 to 762 in the United States from
91 to 145 in the United Kingdom, and from 45 to 82 in Italy (Eurostat, 2009).
The empirical literature on crime and punishment has largely focused on
the deterrent effects of imprisonment or sentence lengths.1 In particular, this
literature aims to identify whether and to what extent the threat of prison can
deter individuals from committing criminal acts.2 In these works, prison is
taken as a uniform sanction. Nevertheless, if we open the black box, we find
very different punitive situations in terms of overcrowding, health services,
social activities for inmates and so on. Theoretically, prison conditions may
affect the deterrent effects of imprisonment: For a given prison sentence,
prison conditions may influence the propensity of individuals to engage
in criminal activities. From a policy perspective, it is important to understand
how prison conditions affect individuals propensity to commit criminal acts.
Indeed, changing prison conditions could be relatively easier and less costly
than other interventions (e.g., increasing incapacitation through sentence
length) that aim to reduce crime.
While the issue of the deterrent effects of prison treatment appears par-
ticularly important for both researchers and policy makers, the empirical ev-
idence is notably scarce. Only a few recent works analyze the effects of
prison conditions on criminal behavior. Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich
(2003) show that more punitive facilities have a small but statistically sig-
nificant deterrent effect by using death rates among prisoners as a proxy for
prison conditions. Exploiting aggregate data on crime rates, they find a de-
cline in local crime rates where prison conditions, measured by death rates,
1. Some contributions in this field are as follows: Nagin (1978), Donohue and Sie-
gelman (1998), Levitt (1998), Kessler and Levitt (1999), Lee and McCrary (2005), Hel-
land and Tabarrok (2007), Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009), and Hjalmarsson (2009).
2. More generally, this stream of literature is related to the extensive literature on
crime and punishment started by Becker (1968). For surveys of empirical and theoretical
works, see Garoupa (1997), Polinsky and Shavell (2000), Western, Kling, and Weiman
(2001), Levitt and Miles (2007), and Bushway and Reuter (2008). Some recent contri-
butions are: Levitt (2004), Di Tella and Dubra (2008), and Owens (2009). For models
that embed Becker’s paradigm in a dynamic equilibrium framework, see Imrohoroglu,
Merlo, and Rupert (2004).
are harsher. Bedard and Helland (2004) exploit the expansion of female
penal system capacity in the United States to study the deterrent effects of
increasing the distance of prisons from cities. They find that, on average,
increasing this distance (assumed to result in a reduced number of visits)
tends to lower the female crime rate. These results conform to the deterrence
hypothesis. However, from these studies it is not possible to understand if the
deterrence effect is driven by the response of former inmates or by the re-
action of criminals who have never received prison treatment (or both).
Moreover, in the absence of a quasi-experimental design, it is not clear
whether harsher prison conditions cause lower crime rates. Unlike previous
studies, Chen and Shapiro (2007) use individual-level data to estimate the
effect of prison conditions on recidivism rates. By exploiting a discontinuity
in the assignment of federal prisoners to security levels, they provide evi-
dence that serving a sentence in a higher security prison implies a higher
post-release propensity to commit a crime.
In this paper, we undertake an empirical analysis of the effects of having
received prison treatment. In particular, we test how prison conditions, mea-
sured by several indicators, affect the propensity of former inmates to recommit
criminal acts. If we assume that incarceration leads criminals to update their
beliefs about the consequences of punishment, we might expect that having
experienced harsher punishment should reduce the propensity to recommit
a crime. This is known as the specific deterrence hypothesis. On the other hand,
harsher prison could also imply a higher level of recidivism as it may lead to
greater human capital depreciation and worse labor outcomes for former
inmates (Waldfogel, 1994). In general, harsher prisons may have criminogenic
effects (Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson, 2009; Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2010).
Discriminating between the two alternatives is inherently an empirical question.
To do this, we exploit a unique large dataset, reporting individual-level data on
the recidivism of former inmates who were released as a result of the Collective
Clemency Bill approved by the Italian Parliament in July 2006. This law,
enacted to address the widespread overcrowding in Italian prisons, provided
for an immediate three-year reduction in detention for all inmates who had com-
mitted a crime before May 2006. Upon approval of the bill, almost twenty-five
thousand inmates were released from 198 Italian prisons on August 1, 2006.
Our analysis concerns two dimensions of prison conditions. First, prison
harshness. We focus on two different features of prison severity: the extent
of overcrowding and the number of deaths (from all causes) in prison during
the inmate’s stay. Death rates and overcrowding are likely to be correlated with
many aspects of unpleasantness of prison facilities, including space limitations,
competition for resources, bad health, and bad health care conditions among
others. Second, we consider the degree of isolation of prisoners from the rest of
society. As a proxy for the degree of isolation, we use the distance from the
prison of detention to the chief town of the province3 in which the prison is
located. Longer distances imply higher costs (in terms of transportation, orga-
nization, and motivation) for volunteer organizations to develop social activ-
ities, education, and job training for inmates. In addition, longer distances
imply less attention from the local media concerning prison problems and
events and fewer visits. This means that the greater the distance of a prison
from the chief province town, the weaker the social ties in which prisoners
are embedded (and thus the higher the degree of isolation from the rest of so-
ciety). As a second proxy for prison isolation, we use the number of volunteers
in a given prison, which is negatively correlated to prison distance.
In order to identify the effects of prison conditions on recidivism, we ex-
ploit an exogenous source of variation provided by the process governing the
assignment of inmates to prisons. Our identification is based on two groups
of former inmates. The first is composed of inmates serving their sentence in
a jurisdiction different from that of their hometown for reasons ranging from
overcrowding in the closest prison to the Italian Prison Administration’s
view that a certain facility is incompatible with the inmate. We label these
prisoners as ‘‘movers.’’ The second group is composed of ‘‘stayers’’ (those
serving their sentence in the same jurisdiction as their hometown) who reside
in a province with more than one prison. As we shall discuss in more detail in
the paper, the institutional procedures for assigning inmates to prisons entail
that the assignment does not depend on individual characteristics that may
explain recidivism but at the same time may be correlated to measures of
prison conditions. Since about 90% of the sample is composed of these
two groups of inmates, we can control for province of residence fixed effects
and so account for any unobserved heterogeneity at the level of the province
3. Italy is organized administratively in territorial areas. In particular, there are
twenty regions, and each region is composed of several provinces (the total number of
provinces is 109). A province corresponds to a large area around a chief town in which
the main economic, social, and administrative activities of the area (e.g., courts, health
services, local headquarters of political parties, volunteer associations) are concentrated.
where these former inmates live. Considering that this is the main source of
unobserved heterogeneity that might correlate with prison conditions, we are
able to minimize an important possible bias. When we estimate the effect of
the number of deaths in prison on individual recidivism, we are able to con-
trol for another potential source of bias. Because the number of facility
deaths that occurred during each former inmate’s period of imprisonment
is an individual-level variable, we can also include prison fixed effects to
control for any kind of nonrandom assignment of inmates to prisons.
Although it is to some extent a popular view that being tough on inmates
can ‘‘rehabilitate’’ them, we do not find evidence supporting the idea that
harsher prison conditions reduce recidivism. Our empirical analysis reveals
that all fourmeasures of harsh prison conditions increase recidivism. Although
the point estimates are not precisely estimated, these results reject the hypoth-
esis that harsh prison conditions strongly decrease former inmates criminal
activity. Interestingly, there is a substantial degree of heterogeneity driving
these results. Italians, who represent about 60% of the total of former inmates
in our sample, seem to react more to prison severity. Indeed, the number of
deaths significantly increases recidivism for Italians. Former inmates with
a relatively long original sentence (above the median in the whole sample)
also respond to a higher number of deaths by increasing their post-release
criminal activity. Taken together, these results suggest that worse prison con-
ditions do not deter individuals who have previously been incarcerated.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical analysis
on the policy-relevant issue of the effect of prison conditions on recidivism.
Our dataset, based on the records of inmates released as a consequence of the
Collective Clemency Bill, allows us to overcome obstacles hampering iden-
tification in the literature. First, it provides criminal data at the individual level,
thus allowing us to overcome the typical identification problems connected
with the use of aggregate crime rates. Unlike Chen and Shapiro (2007), pre-
vious works on prison conditions and recidivism relied on aggregate data. A
second important feature of our dataset is that all these prisoners were released
at the same moment pursuant to the Collective Clemency Bill and thus faced
equal crime opportunities. This not only eliminates the confounding element
of time-varying unobservable characteristics that might correlate with prison
conditions but also creates plausible exogenous variation at the individual
level in the number of deaths during an inmate’s detention. While we cannot
conclude that harsh prison conditions increase recidivism for all former
inmates in our sample, we can exclude strong deterrent effects of experienced
prison severity on recidivism. These results cast doubts on the effectiveness of
imprisonment as a sanction, at least as far as the deterrent effects of prison
severity for those previously sanctioned are concerned. From a policy perspec-
tive, increasing prison severity does not seem an effective approach to reduc-
ing the post-release criminal activity of former inmates.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the prison as-
signment mechanism. In Section 3, we outline the empirical strategy. In the
next section, we present the data. Section 5 presents the results. Finally, in
Section 6 we make some concluding remarks.
2. Prison Assignment Mechanism
At the core of the empirical strategy are several features of the Italian prison
system. Hence, before presenting the identification strategy and the data, it will
be useful to outline the Italian prison system and the institutional procedure for
governing the assignment of inmates to facilities. Unlike other countries, Italy
does not have maximum-security prisons reserved for very dangerous crimi-
nals.4 Inmates responsible for crimes related to the Mafia or terrorism are
assigned to high security sections within a facility in strict isolation from other
inmates. However, as data come from the Italian Collective Clemency Bill, we
do not have these inmates in our data. Italian prisons are classified into twomain
types. The first type—‘‘Casa Circondariale’’—is for inmates waiting for their
first judgment or serving sentences of less than five years. Most of the facilities
in Italy are of this type. The second type—‘‘Casa di Reclusione’’—is for inmates
with longer sentences. In practice, however, the initial dispositions, according to
which inmates with a short sentence should be sent to the first type of facility,
are often violated. The main reason for inmates waiting for their first judgment
or with short sentences to be kept in a ‘‘Casa di Reclusione’’ prison is space
availability problems. In addition, some ‘‘Case di Reclusione’’ have sections
in which inmates awaiting first judgment or convicted of minor crimes serve
their sentences.
4. These special facilities started to operate at the end of the 1970s and were closed
recently. Maximum-security prisons were located in ancient prisons on small islands, and
initially, they hosted Italian terrorists from the 1970s and then individuals convicted of
serious crimes and associated with criminal organizations such as the Mafia.
For the assignment of inmates to facilities, the Italian law5 indicates
that whenever possible, assignment to facilities should follow a territorial
criterion, namely that inmates should be assigned to facilities close to
their town of residence and, in general, within the province of residence.
If arrested and awaiting first judgment, prisoners can be assigned to a fa-
cility close to where they were arrested. After the final judgment, the ter-
ritorial criterion applies. Nonetheless, often the provisions of the law are
not applied. Indeed, an inmate can be assigned to a facility outside her
province of residence if the Department of Prison Administration (DAP)
envisages some kind of incompatibility. Possible reasons are as follows:
a reasonable presumption that assignment to a facility inside the province
of residence could be dangerous for the inmate and/or for other inmates in
the facility; the particular needs of the detention facility (e.g., overcrowd-
ing or inaccessibility); or needs of the inmate, such as health care or study.
When an inmate is assigned to a facility outside her province of residence
but still in the same region, it is the regional directorate of the DAP that
decides which facility the inmate will be assigned to. If for any reason
the mover is assigned to a facility outside her region of residence, the
destination is decided directly by the central directorate of the DAP.6
In the empirical analysis, these inmates compose the group of ‘‘movers.’’
We conducted several interviews with members of the inmates rights asso-
ciation ‘‘Ristretti’’ and DAP officers7 in order to understand in greater detail
the decision-making process concerning movers. As a first step, we needed
to know the variables that the decision maker (the DAP officer) uses to de-
cide who becomes a mover and then how assignment to facilities works.
According to the information collected in our interviews, the decision
maker decides that an inmate cannot be assigned to the facility closest to
her hometown in two possible cases. At the moment of arrest or conviction,
each inmate is provided with an inmate’s dossier containing personal
5. See in particular the Decree of the President of the Republic, 230, 30 June 2000,
and Law 354/1975 (Article 42).
6. Italian public administration is in general organized on a territorial basis. Central
administrations operate at national level and then there are territorial administrations at
region and province (within regions) levels.
7. Wewish to thank FrancescoMorelli (Ristretti) and Antonella Barone (Ministry of
Justice) for providing us with precious information about the assignment process.
information and a summaryof the judicial sentencing decision.On the basis of
this dossier, the decisionmaker evaluateswhether there is any incompatibility
between the inmate and the facility closest to her hometown. It is worth noting
that for first-time inmates, the dossier contains roughly the same character-
istics that we have in our dataset (i.e., personal characteristics, sentence
length, and sentence motivation, in our case the crime committed). More pre-
cisely, according to our interviews, the variables that we understand the of-
ficer to use for first-time inmates are sentence length, sex and nationality of the
offender, and the type of crime committed. The second reason for incompat-
ibility is that the closest facility has reached a maximum threshold of over-
crowding. For each facility, this threshold depends on an evaluation by the
prison administration and may vary according to local conditions at the
facility level (e.g., in some facilities in periods of prison tension and violence,
an overcrowding rate of 150%maybe rated as being above the threshold level,
whereas in other periods, this overcrowding rate may be considered below the
threshold). Once an inmate is designated to be a mover, the decision process
governing assignment to facilities follows a ‘‘space availability’’ criterion.8An
inmate is assigned to one of the facilities that at the moment of assignment are
less overcrowded or below the threshold level. Hence, for movers, the facility
is determined according to the amount of space available in other facilities at
the moment of arrest or conviction. If the moment of conviction is orthogonal
to unobserved inmate characteristics,we can safely assume that characteristics
of movers do not predict the quality of the facility assigned.9 Similar obser-
vations can bemade regarding the assignment of inmateswho reside in a prov-
ince with more than one prison and are not designated as movers. The process
governing the assignment of these inmates (‘‘stayers’’) is also based on a
‘‘space availability’’ criterion. At the moment of arrest, individuals are
assigned to the prison with the least difficulty to receive inmates.
8. For example, in a recent interview, the regional director of DAP for the Bologna
region declared that the facilities in the region are reaching a level of overcrowding that
will require the transfer of inmates to regions where more space is available (see the daily
newspaper: Il Resto del Carlino March 4, 2008, ‘‘Bologna: Provveditore; carceri piene?
Trasferiamo i detenuti’’).
9. Kuziemko (2007) and Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) provide evidence
supporting the idea that the moment of conviction is orthogonal to inmates unobservable
characteristics.
3. Empirical Model
In the literature, identifying the effect of quality of life in prison (over-
crowding index and number of deaths) and of prison isolation (distance from
the chief town and number of volunteers) on recidivism is difficult because
inmate characteristics are likely to be correlated to prison conditions. It could
be that prison quality is worse in areas where former inmates have a lower
opportunity cost of committing a crime. For example, a higher overcrowding
index may simply be the result of many arrests in a city in which the relative
cost of committing crime is low. It could equally be possible that areas with
lower crime intensity have prisons with bad quality conditions. In any case,
the estimated impact of prison conditions on recidivism would be biased. In
order to provide a credible estimate of the relationship between prison qual-
ity and recidivism, we must account for this unobserved heterogeneity.
In the empirical analysis, we use measures of prison conditions that vary
at the prison level and a measure of prison conditions that varies within each
prison at the individual level (the number of deaths). For the indicators of
prison conditions that are individual invariant, the model that we estimate
exploits the presence of prisoners serving their sentences in jurisdictions
other than their hometown (the movers) and of those who serve their sen-
tences in their province of residence in which more than one prison is present
(the stayers). This allows us to include province of residence fixed effects
absorbing any kind of heterogeneity at the province level that is correlated to
prison conditions. For the measure varying at the individual level, we can
also include prison fixed effects. The model that we estimate is:
yijh ¼ aþ b1Zij þ
X
bkxiðkÞ þ kh þ cj þ eijh; ð1Þ
where i denotes the individual and j the prison where his sentence was
served, h the province of residence, and Z the measure of prison conditions,
and for most of the inmates, j is located in a province h other than the one
where individual i lives after release (i.e., j is different from h) or for the same
province h we have more than one prison j. The outcome we observe, y, is
equal to 1 if the individual was rearrested during the interval of time con-
sidered (seven months) and 0 otherwise. The set of variables at the individual
level, denoted by x, includes gender, marital status, education, the most re-
cent crime, employment status before arrest, and sentence. The type of crime
and the sentence are the most important variables in terms of the dangerous-
ness of the former inmate. We also include time served as an individual vari-
able because it is, in general, different from the sentence (time served and
sentence do not coincide since our data come from the Collective Clemency
Bill, which provided for an immediate three-year reduction in detention for
all inmates who had committed a crime before May 2, 2006).
Under the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity across movers and
stayers living in a province with at least two prisons is uncorrelated with
prison quality, when Z is individual invariant, the estimated b1 captures
the causal impact of our measure of prison quality on recidivism. In other
words, to estimate the causal effect of prison conditions on recidivism, the
assumption is that unobserved characteristics of inmates do not determine
the assignment to harsher prisons. When the measure of prison condition
varies at the individual level within each prison, we can relax this assumption
since it is possible to include prison fixed effects cj that control for any pos-
sible nonrandom assignment of inmates into prisons. The measure of prison
condition varying at the individual level is the number of deaths during the
inmate’s prison spell. The number of deaths occurring during the period of
imprisonment is positively correlated with the inmate’s prison spell. How-
ever, the inclusion of time served and sentence as additional regressors
should avoid that for a given sentence the deaths variable will merely pick
up the effects of more time served in the prison. Hence, identification of the
coefficient on the number of deaths is obtained by exploiting variation in the
number of deaths observed by former inmates who served different prison
spells, conditional on their original sentence.10
4. Data
4.1. Individual Level Data
We perform our analysis of the effects of prison conditions on recidi-
vism by means of a unique dataset constructed from various sources. First,
individual-level variables of former inmate individual characteristics and
10. Once we control for sentence, whether one inmate served more time than an-
other is due to the date of entry in prison, a variable that is as good as random. (We pro-
vided evidence consistent with this assumption in Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009).)
recidivism are drawn from an internal database that the Italian DAP main-
tains on offenders under its care. We were granted access to the DAP da-
tabase records on all the individuals released pursuant to the collective
pardon law between August 1, 2006 and February 28, 2007. This law,
enacted to address the widespread overcrowding in Italian prisons, provided
for an immediate three-year reduction in detention for all inmates who had
committed a crime before May 2, 2006.11 This feature of the data is partic-
ularly useful for our analysis because all the subjects in our sample are an-
alyzed in the same time span, thus avoiding any possible correlation between
time and prison quality. The full sample includes 25,814 individuals. For
each individual, the data provide information on whether or not the individ-
ual committed another crime in the period between release and February 28,
2007. Most of the individuals reentering prison by this date were caught by
police while they were committing a criminal act and were subject to pretrial
detention, that is, they had not already been processed through the justice
system when they reentered prison. The dataset contains information con-
cerning a large number of variables at the individual and facility level. For
each individual, information is reported on: the facility where the sentence
was served, the official length of the sentence, the actual time served in
the facility, and the kind of crime committed (i.e., the last crime committed
in the individual’s criminal history). Moreover, for most of the inmates, the
data also report inmates age, level of education, marital status, nationality,
province of residence, employment status before being sentenced to prison,
and whether the individual has received the first verdict for previous crimes
at the date of release. The Appendix provides a more detailed description of
the variables included in the dataset and of crimes included in the different
crime categories. Since data on subsequent convictions are not available,
we use a subsequent criminal charge and imprisonment as the measure
for recidivism.
4.2. Data on Prison Quality
Data on prison quality refer to two dimensions of life in prison. First, prison
harshness measured by an overcrowding prison index and an in-prison death
11. See Barbarino andMastrobuoni (2007) and Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009)
for a detailed description of the institutional environment.
rate. Second, prison isolation measured by the number of volunteers operating
in a prison and the distance between each facility and chief town of the province
where the facility is located. For data on prison harshness, the rate of over-
crowding at the facility level is directly provided by the DAP database facility.
Excluding judiciary mental hospitals from our sample (98 inmates), it covers
198 prisons. Data on the number of deaths that occurred in each residential
facility during each former inmate’s period of imprisonment were constructed
by referring to the report on ‘‘Deaths in Prison’’ from the Associazione
Ristretti.12 For each inmate, we count the number of deaths that occurred
in the facility of detention from 2003 (or, alternatively, from an inmate’s mo-
ment of entry into the facility for those arrested after January 1, 2003) to
July 2006 (the last month spent in prison for all the individuals in our sam-
ple). Note that this measure of deaths occurring in a prison is different from
the measure used by Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003), who resort to
aggregate data and use the total number of deaths (per thousand inmates)
occurring in a state’s prison system. Unlike Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich
(2003), we can construct a measure of the number of deaths that occurred in
a facility from the moment of entry for each individual in the dataset (in
particular, for those who entered starting from January 2003). This mea-
sure is particularly useful for evaluating the effect of prison conditions on
post-release criminal behavior as it captures the specific conditions faced
by each individual during the time served in a facility. For the same orig-
inal sentence length, this variable depends on the moment of entry into
prison. It is reasonable to believe that inmates perceive the degree of
prison harshness at the moment of entry and this may matter for future
recidivism. Therefore, it should be clear that for a given perception of
prison harshness that inmates receive at the moment of entry (which
the inclusion of prison fixed effects controls for), the high-frequency var-
iation of this variable captures the effect of having seen an additional
death in prison.
Finally, we independently construct the measure of distance and vol-
unteer presence in the facilities. We report the road distance between each
12. Associazione Ristretti is an association for inmates rights. The report morti in
carcere on deaths in prison has been conducted annually by directly collecting news about
deaths in the Italian prison system. It reports monthly information about each death at
facility level. (The report is downloadable from the website: www.ristretti.it.)
facility and chief town of the province, where the facility is located by
calculating the distance in kilometers between the facility address and each
town.13 The measure of distance should capture the degree of prison iso-
lation. Ceteris paribus, the more distant a prison facility from the chief
town is, the higher the costs are for associations, groups of volunteers,
and civil rights organizations to access the prison to develop social activ-
ities, education, and job training for inmates.14 Since both the population
density and the density of associations are higher in chief towns, offering
a certain social activity in a prison more distant from the town implies
higher costs of transportation, organization, and motivation of volunteers.
Greater distances also imply less attention by the local media to prison
problems and events. More generally, the degree of osmosis between
prison and the rest of society is higher in facilities located near the center
of the chief town. As for the volunteers, for the facilities for which this
information is available, we count the number of volunteers as reported
by the facility administration.15 We construct an index of volunteer den-
sity by dividing the number of volunteers by the number of inmates present
in the facility at the end of 2005. These volunteers are members of reli-
gious, political, and civil rights organizations that have access to prisons to
give moral assistance to inmates and to develop educational, recreational,
and job training programs.16 It is important to stress that these programs
are not initiated or promoted by the prison administration but are the out-
come of the voluntary action of associations. The result of the process is
a unique dataset including for each inmate a measure of recidivism, indi-
vidual characteristics, and facility-level information.
13. We use the road distance as calculated by the Internet map site www.viamichelin.
com. This allows us to calculate the distance to any facility address from the chief town
or city center coordinates (the website automatically calculates the coordinates of the
town or city center).
14. In Italy, there is a strong tradition of associations organizing activities in prison
facilities, with an important contribution made by volunteers.
15. Data on volunteers have been provided by the association FIVOL (Fondazione
Italiana Volontariato—www.fivol.it), while data on the number of inmates in each facility
are provided by the Associazione Antigone and published in the report ‘‘Dentro il Car-
cere,’’ Carocci, Rome (2006).
16. Unfortunately, we are not able to distinguish between the different kinds of pro-
grams and assistance offered to inmates.
4.3. Descriptive Statistics
In the empirical analysis, we exclude individuals for whom the original
sentence is missing, and we consider only individuals released in August
2006 (81% of the sample). Thus, we have a homogeneous sample along
both the date of release and the length of window we observe. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics on the individual-level data for the entire sam-
ple of individuals (column 1) released. The sample is mainly composed of
males (95.4%). The average original sentence and the time served are 39
and 24.47 months, respectively, and the average recidivism in the seven-
month period is 0.115. Most of inmates have been convicted for property
crimes including thefts and robberies (about 40% of the sample) and for
violation of the law regulating the use and selling of drugs (about 40% of
the sample). Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish drug dealers from users
in our sample. Inmates convicted for violent crimes (includingmurders and
assaults) are about 10% of the sample. The missing crime category refers to
a few other categories each accounting for less than 0.5% of the total num-
ber of inmates in the sample. In panels 1–4 in Figure 1 we report the histo-
grams for each of the four measures of prison conditions. The average
overcrowding index is 150 and there is substantial variation in this index.
Each inmate had seen 1.31 deaths on average during his detention. Nor-
malizing this number for the prison population of each facility gives
0.0045. The average distance of the prison from the jurisdiction chief town
is 15.99 km, and the average number of volunteers operating in the facility
is 0.14 in per capita terms. In columns 2–3 of Table 1, we report summary
statistics on the two groups of inmates on which we obtain identification of
the effect of prison conditions on recidivism. The first group is composed of
former inmates who served their sentence in a facility outside their prov-
ince of residence (these inmates are labeled ‘‘movers’’ and summary sta-
tistics are reported in column 2). The second group is composed of those
who served their sentence in a prison located in their province of residence
in which more than one prison is present (summary statistics in column 3).
While differences between the entire sample and the two subsamples are
not an issue for identification, it is worth noting that most of the observable
characteristics are similar. A notable exception is that in column 2 movers
have a longer original sentence, whereas in column 3, the original sentence
is shorter compared to column 1.
Table 1. Individual Characteristics
Whole
Sample (1) Movers (2)
Stayers in Province
with more than
One Prison (3)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Original sentence
(in months)
38.982 (32.58) 42.896 (34.15) 35.287 (30.35)
Time served (in months) 24.471 (29.34) 27.869 (31.01) 21.287 (27.15)
Recidivism 0.115 (0.319) 0.119 (0.324) 0.116 (0.320)
Overcrowding (number of
prisoners for hundred
available places in the
detention facility)
150.17 (40.89) 148.46 (41.65) 149.37 (40.63)
Average number of
deaths occurred
during detention
in the same facility
for (each inmate)
1.318 (2.493) 1.007 (1.901) 1.890 (3.234)
Distance from
jurisdiction chief-
town in km
15.993 (21.46) 19.143 (24.64) 14.680 (17.91)
Number of volunteers
per capita
0.141 (0.156) 0.137 (0.154) 0.112 (0.104)
Age on exit 38.764 (10.53) 38.351 (10.59) 39.401 (10.69)
Percentage of males 0.954 (0.209) 0.951 (0.215) 0.952 (0.213)
Share of Italians 0.621 (0.485) 0.559 (0.496) 0.712 (0.452)
Married 0.284 (0.451) 0.282 (0.450) 0.293 (0.455)
Area of residence
North 0.425 (0.494) 0.424 (0.424) 0.356 (0.356)
Center 0.185 (0.388) 0.161 (0.367) 0.229 (0.420)
South 0.378 (0.488) 0.392 (0.485) 0.414 (0.492)
Education
Compulsory 0.901 (0.296) 0.889 (0.300) 0.909 (0.286)
High school 0.079 (0.270) 0.081 (0.273) 0.073 (0.260)
College (degree or
equivalent)
0.009 (0.096) 0.010 (0.099) 0.009 (0.097)
Permanently employed 0.339 (0.473) 0.337 (0.472) 0.334 (0.471)
First judgment taken 0.998 (0.442) 0.999 (0.446) 0.999 (0.439)
Kind of offense
Drug offenses 0.404 (0.490) 0.425 (0.494) 0.379 (0.485)
Crime against property 0.412 (0.492) 0.399 (0.489) 0.438 (0.496)
Crimes against
public safety
0.005 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 0.005 (0.005)
Gun law 0.012 (0.109) 0.010 (0.104) 0.013 (0.115)
Immigration bill 0.029 (0.168) 0.028 (0.156) 0.023 (0.150)
Violent crimes 0.099 (0.292) 0.092 (0.289) 0.089 (0.284)
Number of observations 20,950 11,097 7,779
4.4. Evidence on the Identifying Assumption
The assumption for the identification of Equation (1) is that the assign-
ment of movers and of stayers living in a province with more than one prison
does not depend on individual unobserved characteristics that explain recid-
ivism and are correlated to prison quality. (This assumption is not necessary
when the measure of prison conditions is the number of deaths because this
varies over time and prison fixed effects controlling for any possible non-
random assignment can be included.) Note that it is not necessary that being
a mover or stayer living in a province with more than one prison is uncor-
related with prison conditions, but rather that once an inmate is designated as
a mover or stayer, his destination does not depend on prison conditions.
As discussed in Section 2, the process governing prison assignment sup-
ports the identifying assumption: The assignment to a facility is determined
according to the amount of space available in other facilities at the moment
of arrest or conviction, which suggests that unobservable inmates character-
istics and prison conditions are not correlated. It is possible to provide an
Figure 1. Distributions of the Measures of Prison Conditions.
indirect test of this hypothesis. Specifically, we test whether (conditioning on
the province of residence) there is a significant relationship between the
observable characteristics of former inmates and the proxy for prison con-
ditions.17 If selection on observables is similar to selection on unobservables,
a lack of a strong relationship between prison quality and observable charac-
teristics indicates empirical support for the identification strategy, suggesting
a zero correlation between unobservables and prison quality. More precisely,
this test can be performed by estimating regressions for three measures of
prison conditions on individual observable characteristics and then by running
an F-test on the coefficients of the inmates observables. In symbols, we test
the following models:
overcrowding indexij ¼ aþ
X
bkxiðkÞ þ kh þ eij; ð2Þ
prisondistij ¼ aþ
X
bkxiðkÞ þ kh þ eij; ð3Þ
volunteers ðpercapitaÞij ¼ aþ
X
bkxiðkÞ þ kh þ eij: ð4Þ
Here j and i stand for the facility-level and individual-level indexes, and kh is
the province of residence fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
prison level as in the regression analysis in the next sections. When we run
these regressions, the test of the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients
bk on observables at the individual level are all equal to 0 gives an F-statistic
of 1.29 when we regress the overcrowding index, 1.96 when we regress prison
distance, and of 1.14 when we regress the number of volunteers per capita.
While an F-statistic of 1.96 for prison distance suggests that there might be
some type of nonrandom assignment of inmates to more distant prisons, it
17. After prison conviction, the dossier upon which the DAP decides the final des-
tination of first-time inmates contains roughly the same characteristics that we have in our
dataset (i.e., personal characteristics, sentence length, and sentence motivation, in our case
the crime committed). Therefore, if the process of assignment involves inmate character-
istics, by controlling for these, we still would obtain consistent estimates of prison con-
ditions on recidivism, and this balancing test on observables would not be very
informative. Unfortunately, we do not have the complete criminal history of inmates,
and we cannot discriminate between first-time and repeat offenders.
is comforting that taken together these results do not point to a systematic
selection of less or more dangerous inmates to harsher prisons. Indeed, the
correlation between the measures of harsh prison conditions and some key
individual variables correlated to inmates dangerousness (e.g., age, original
sentence, and type of crime) is sometimes positive and sometimes negative.18
5. Results
Given the large number of fixed effects included in our models, we rely on
linear probability models. Our dependent variable is 1 if between August 1,
2006 and February 28, 2007, the individual was rearrested, and 0 otherwise.
The individual variables included in the specifications are age, sentence,
time served, education, employment status and marital status before the first
conviction, nationality, and gender. Standard errors are adjusted for cluster-
ing at the prison level to allow any arbitrary autocorrelation of the errors in
each prison.19 In presenting the results, we also report some differential
effects. Specifically, we report the coefficients on the measures of prison
conditions for foreign and Italian inmates and for former inmates with an
original sentence above and below the median. Since we find some hetero-
geneity in the response to prison conditions between Italian and foreign
inmates, Figures 2 reports the same histograms reported in Figure 1 for
for Italian and foreign inmates, respectively.
18. There is another piece of evidence that supports the identifying assumption. As
we can see from Table 1, individuals in columns 2–3 are different from the whole sample
(column 1) in some individual variables. For example, by regressing a dummy equal to 1,
if an inmate is a mover on all the observables, we find that some individual variables are
strong predictors for being a mover (in particular, sentence length and being non-Italian
have a positive effect on the probability of being a mover, whereas age has a negative
effect). It seems plausible to assume that if the assignment of movers to prisons is not
as good as random, in the assignment process, the decision maker should use at least some
of the information he actually possesses to determine who becomes a mover. For example,
one should expect that if assignment is not random, sentence length should play a role in
assignment. The fact that length of sentence and some other variables predict mover status
but not prison quality measures provides further support to our hypothesis that there is no
correlation between the individual determinants of recidivism and assignment to a better or
worse quality prison.
19. While clustering at the prison level seems to be more appropriate in this context,
we also tried to cluster standard errors at the province of residence level but this did not
alter the basic results.
Figure 2. Distributions of the Measures of Prison Conditions for Italian and
Foreign Inmates.
5.1. The Effect of Mortality in Prison
We start by discussing the results using prison deaths per capita as the
indicator of the quality of life in prison (see Table 2). This indicator varies
at the individual level within each prison. Because the impact on recidivism
of the number of deaths may depend on the length of stay, we scale out of the
death rate measure the variation in time served. Hence, in the regression, we
use the number of deaths per capita normalized for the length of stay.
In column 1, not controlling for province of residence and prison fixed
effects, the number of deaths significantly increases recidivism. The specifi-
cation in column 2 ‘‘soaks up’’ most variation in the data by including province
of residence fixed effects and prison fixed effects. The coefficient on deaths per
capita is still positive but it is estimated with less precision (the t-statistic is
1.22). A 1 standard deviation increase in the number of deaths per capita
(0.0088) increases the probability of recidivism of 0.005 percentage points
(4.2%). In column 3, we report the coefficient on the number of deaths per
capita not normalized for the length of stay in prison, and the coefficient is
still positive. Overall, from this analysis, we do not find compelling evidence
that harsh prison conditions reduce recidivism.20 When we split the sample
between Italian and foreign inmates, we observe a stronger and statistically
significant relationship between number of deaths and recidivism for Italians
but not for foreigners (columns 4–5). From Figure 2, it appears that this het-
erogeneity is not related to different exposure to prison conditions of Italian
and foreign inmates. Finally, inmates with higher original sentences are more
responsive to harsh prison conditions measured by deaths (columns 6–7).
To have an idea of the quantitative relevance of the effects we find, it is
useful to compare these results with those of Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich
(2003) (hereafter KLS). This comparison should be taken cautiously as it is
difficult to generalize results from different contexts, such as the United States
and Italy. Using death rates among prisoners as a proxy for prison conditions,
20. Note that for each inmate we have the number of deaths that occurred in the
facility of detention from 2003 (or, alternatively, from an inmate’s moment of entrance
into the facility for those arrested after January 1, 2003) to July 2006. In a given facility,
this measure is the same for all the former inmates with long sentences that started before
2003. In the prison fixed-effects specification, identification of the coefficient on the num-
ber of deaths is obtained by using information on inmates with sentences that started after
2003. Results are essentially unchanged when we restrict the sample to only these inmates.
Table 2. Number of Deaths and Recidivism
(1)
Whole
Sample
(2)
Whole
Sample
(3)
Whole
Sample (4) Italians (5) Foreign
(6)
Sentence
Above the
Median
(7)
Sentence
Below the
Median
Number of deaths per
capita normalized
for the length of stay
0.00407
(1.61)
0.00499
(1.22)
0.00892
(1.91)
0.00081
(0.08)
0.01294
(2.08)
0.00344
(0.46)
Number of deaths per
capita (not normalized
for the length of stay)
0.42312
(1.11)
Province of residence
fixed effects
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prison fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.021 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.02 0.057 0.058
Observations 19,287 19,287 19,316 12,117 7,170 9,837 9,450
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. All specifications include province of residence and prison fixed effects. Individual variables include original sentence, time served, education levels,
and age at the date of release, a dummy indicating marital status, nationality, and employment condition before imprisonment, and type of crime. Standard errors are clustered at the prison
level.
KLS show that harsher prison conditions are associated with lower local crime
rates. The estimated effects, however, are small. The elasticity of the murder
rate to the prison death rate per thousand prisoners is between 0.005
and 0.048. For property crimes, the elasticity ranges from 0.05
to 0.17, and for violent crimes it is significantly lower. These elasticities
may not incorporate the post-release response of former inmates to harsher
prison conditions. In fact, they are calculated by regressing crime rates on
contemporary prison conditions and reveal that harsh prison conditions have
a general deterrent effect on the non-incarcerated. As far as our results are
concerned, if we now consider the point estimate from column 2, the implied
elasticity of annual recidivism rate (0.20) to the prison death rate per thousand
inmates is about 0.024. If we consider the upper limit of the confidence in-
terval of the estimated effect, this elasticity is about 0.064, whereas if we con-
sider the lower limit, the elasticity is negative and close to 0. For a relevant
group of individuals (i.e., Italian inmates), the effect is precisely estimated and
the result is almost the double of what appears in column 2. Thus, our esti-
mates suggest that former inmates may have a response to harsher prison con-
ditions which is of the opposite sign with respect to the non-incarcerated.
Some of our estimates are comparable to some of the effects estimated by
KLS at least for the murder rate and violent crimes. However, in general
our estimates do not seem to be large enough to outweigh the effects estimated
byKLS. In fact, KLS provide some specifications inwhich they include the in-
prison death rate with several lags. They find that the lagged values of harsh
prison conditions reduce crime rates, where the lagged values of in-prison
death rates should capture both a general deterrent effect (on the whole pop-
ulation) and a specific deterrent effect of prison harshness (on former inmates).
Finally, it is worth noting that a lack of deterrence for the whole sample
might be simply due to the short time period of seven months. While there
are not any obvious reasons to believe that in the long run the results would
change, it should be clear that it is hard to draw any strong conclusions about
long-run effects.21
21. We address a similar issue in Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) in which we
offer evidence consistent with the fact that the deterrent effects of prison sentences should
not change in the long run. Indeed, the averages of the main observable characteristics of
those relapsing after seventeen months are very similar to the averages of those reentering
prison in the seven-month period.
5.2. The Effect of Overcrowding and Prison Isolation
In Table 3, we present the results of the remaining measures of prison
conditions. Unlike deaths per capita, these do not vary at the individual level
and, therefore, it is not possible to include prison fixed effects. In all col-
umns, we present the most complete specification with individual-level con-
trol variables and province of residence fixed effects. From column 1, the
coefficient on the overcrowding index is positive but imprecisely estimated.
It reveals a very small effect on recidivism. (An increase of 1 percentage
point in the overcrowding index implies an increase of 0.00003 in the prob-
ability of being rearrested.) We try to obtain more precise estimates of the
effects of the overcrowding index on recidivism by excluding from the
regressions potential outliers: the most populated prisons and then the least
populated prisons in absolute values. However, neither the size nor the pre-
cision of the estimated effects improves (results not reported). Overall, as the
overcrowding index should reflect prison harshness, these results are con-
sistent with the previous ones on death rates.
Columns 2–3 present the results on prison isolation measured by the
distance from the prison of detention to the chief town of the province
in which the prison is located and by the per capita number of volunteers.
The point estimate on prison location reveals that a greater distance is pos-
itively associated with recidivism. The lack of precision in the estimates
does not allow us to draw any conclusive result concerning prison distance,
but prison isolation measured by distance does not seem to have a strong
deterrent effect on recidivism. From column 3, we observe that increasing
numbers of volunteers reduces recidivism, but this effect is also impre-
cisely estimated. The results are essentially unchanged when we include
all three measures (overcrowding index, distance, and volunteers) in col-
umn 4 and when we add also the death measure in column 5. Splitting the
sample between Italians and foreign inmates and between inmates with low
and original sentences confirm the previous findings in Table 2 that for the
Italians and inmates with high original sentences, harsher prison conditions
increase recidivism.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the effects of prison conditions on
post-release recidivism among former Italian inmates. We have studied the
Table 3. Overcrowding, Prison Location, and Volunteers on Recidivism
(1)
Whole
Sample
(2)
Whole
Sample
(3)
Whole
Sample
(4)
Whole
Sample
(5)
Whole
Sample
(6)
Italians
(7)
Foreign
(8)
Sentence
Above
the
Median
(9)
Sentence
Below
the
Median
Prison
overcrowding
index
0.00003
(0.33)
0.00002
(0.20)
0.00002
(0.25)
0.00014
(1.21)
0.00011
(1.10)
0.00005
(0.62)
0.00010
(0.67)
Distance from the
chief town in km
0.00008
(0.67)
0.00005
(0.33)
0.00004
(0.24)
0.00007
(0.0.40)
0.00020
(1.02)
0.00006
(0.43)
0.00000
(0.01)
Number of
volunteers
per capita
0.0.1921
(1.21)
0.01879
(1.07)
0.0124
(0.45)
0.0.2871
(1.49)
0.00909
(0.29)
0.03410
(1.37)
0.00919
(0.29)
Number of deaths
per
capita
normalized for
the length of stay
0.00459
(1.63)
0.00597
(1.61)
0.00269
(0.52)
0.00525
(1.56)
0.00475
(0.91)
R2 0.032 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.040 0.036 0.040 0.034
Observations 19303 18886 17084 16724 16700 10512 6188 8503 8197
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parenthesis. All specifications include province of residence fixed effects. Individual variables include original sentence, time served, education levels, age at the
date of release, a dummy indicating marital status, employment condition before imprisonment, and type of crime. Standard errors are clustered at the prison level.
effects of two main dimensions of prison conditions: prison harshness
(proxied by prison overcrowding and number of deaths in prison) and
prison isolation (proxied by the distance of the chief provincial town from
the prison and by the number of volunteers). Our research strategy relies on
a unique dataset reporting the individual-level characteristics and behavior
of more than twenty-five thousand former Italian inmates. Our data give us
the possibility of controlling for the main sources of heterogeneity in as-
signment to particular prisons. Contrary to the specific deterrent hypoth-
esis, according to which harsher prison conditions should reduce
recidivism, we do not find compelling evidence that higher degrees of
prison harshness or isolation contribute to reducing the propensity to
re-engage in criminal activities. Overall, prison harshness, measured by
overcrowding and numbers of deaths in prison, exacerbates recidivism.
These results are in line with Chen and Shapiro (2007), who, using differ-
ent data on a different country, do not find evidence consistent with the
specific deterrence hypothesis. It is important to remark that the results
in this paper do not rule out the possibility that harsh prison conditions
have a general deterrent effect on criminals who have never received prison
treatment, an issue that we cannot address with our design. Taken together,
however, our results on the specific deterrent effect of prison conditions
support the view expressed by Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (2003,
p. 340) on the limited aggregate impact of changing prison conditions
on crime rates: ‘‘Given the limited efficiency gains implied by these esti-
mates, the moral and ethical considerations surrounding these issues would
appear to dominate any economic arguments. In a society predicated on
civil liberties, the social costs of degrading living conditions in prisons
beyond their current state are likely to overwhelm any marginal reductions
in crime.’’
Appendix
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE INDIVIDUAL-
LEVEL DATASET
Original sentence (in months): this is the original sentence to which
the inmate was convicted before being released pursuant to the Col-
lective Clemency.
Time served (in months): this is the time served in prison before
being released pursuant to the Collective Clemency bill.
Married: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate was married be-
fore the last conviction and 0 otherwise. Education
Education Compulsory: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate
completed the compulsory school period. For Italians, this is equal to
the junior high school degree and 0 otherwise.
Education Highschool: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate
obtained a high school degree and 0 otherwise.
Education College degree: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate
completed or obtained a college degree or equivalent (e.g., the so-
called laurea breve in the Italian system) and 0 otherwise.
Permanently employed: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate
had a full time contract of employment before being convicted and
0 otherwise.
First judgment taken: this is a dummy equal to 1 if the inmate has
been convicted at least in the first instance. It is 0 if the inmate is still
waiting for the first judgment when he is released pursuant to the Col-
lective Clemency.
Drug offenses: all violations of the law on the use and selling of
drugs (Decree of the President of the Republic October 9th 1990, 309,
and subsequent modifications and amendments).
Crimes against property: theft, larceny, robbery, bag snatching,
and in general all the offenses regulated by Book II Section XIII
of the Italian Penal Code.
Crimes against public safety: all crimes related to possible danger
to the safety of people, things, public utilities, and buildings. All
the crimes in this category are included in Book II Section VI of
the Italian Penal Code.
Gun law: all violations of the law on using and carrying guns and
other arms (Law 110/75 and subsequent modifications and amend-
ments).
Immigration bill: all violations of the law on the regulation
of immigration and the juridical status of foreign citizens (Law
July, 25th 1998 n.286 and subsequent amendments and modifica-
tions).
Violent crimes: assault, homicide, and in general all the of-
fenses regulated by Book II Section XII of the Italian Penal
Code.
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